Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) finds the key of a block cipher using differential information between correct and faulty ciphertexts obtained by inducing faults during the computation of ciphertexts. Among many ciphers AES has been the main target of DFA due to its popularity. DFA of AES has also been diversified into several directions: reducing the required number of faults, applying it to multi-byte fault models, extending to AES-192 and AES-256, or exploiting faults induced at an earlier round.
Introduction
Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) uses differential information between correct and faulty ciphertexts to retrieve the secret key. Normally an attacker gets faulty ciphertexts by giving external impact on a device with voltage variation, glitch, laser, etc. [4] . The first DFA presented by Biham and Shamir in 1997 [8] targeted DES [1] . Afterward many people tried to break article [21] , we showed that the AES-192 key could be found with two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and AES-256 key could be found with three pairs.
Moradi et al. proposed DFA in multi-byte fault models where several bytes are assumed to be corrupted together in 2006 [28] . In an 8-bit architecture one-byte fault model is desirable. However depending on implementation, i.e., 16-bit/32-bit architecture or software implementation, multi-byte fault model can be much useful. In 2009, Saha et al. categorized multi-byte fault models in detail and presented more efficient DFA [35] , where two or four pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts are required.
The last research direction is the utilization of the faults induced at an earlier round. The general countermeasure of DFA is to protect the last few rounds. As redundancy is costly, one should ascertain exactly which rounds need to be protected. Phan and Yen first showed that the faults induced one or two rounds earlier than other DFA could be used to find the key [32] . In DFA of DES Rivain showed that the faults in the middle rounds could be used [34] .
We know that the numbers of faults to find the key are different even in the same (or similar) fault model in the previous works. Given the pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and a fault model, the attacker constructs so called differential fault equations (DFE's) that consist of ciphertexts, subkeys, and the characteristics of faulty values. Then she finds subkeys by solving them. However, the methods of constructing and solving DFE's are different for every attack, which leads to different numbers of required faults. Therefore we first present how to generate differential fault equations systematically and reduce the number of candidates of the key with them, which leads us to find the minimum number of faults in a given fault model. Then we extend our attacks to AES-192/256 and multi-byte fault models. Our methods have the following advantages compared to the previous works:
• A systematic approach to constructing and solving differential fault equations has been proposed. Based on this we can estimate how many wrong candidates of the subkey can be removed before solving the equations, which leads us to find the minimum number of faults in a given fault model.
• We propose a more efficient DFA of AES-128 in a multi-byte fault model where at most twelve bytes are corrupted together. We can find the key with three faults while the previous attack [35] needs four faults.
• We propose the first result on DFA of AES-192 and DFA of AES-256 in multi-byte fault models. We can find the AES-192 key with two faults when at most eight bytes are corrupted together and three faults when at most twelve bytes are corrupted together. We can find the AES-256 key with three faults when at most eight bytes are corrupted together and four faults when at most twelve bytes are corrupted together.
• In the extended abstract of this article [21] , we showed that the AES-192 key could be found with two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts with 2 8 exhaustive search and AES-256 key could be found with three pairs with 2 32 exhaustive search. We presented improved techniques that required no exhaustive search at the workshop [22] . We describe them in detail in this article.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We briefly describe AES in Section 2. We explain our fault models in Section 3. Then Section 4 introduces how to generate differential fault equations in a byte-fault model. The next section describes differential fault analysis on AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 using differential fault equations defined in the previous section. Then Section 6 and 7 deal with multi-byte fault models. Finally Section 8 compares proposed attacks with existing ones and concludes the article.
AES
AES [2] can encrypt and decrypt 128-bit blocks with 128, 192, or 256 bitkeys. The intermediate computation result of AES, called state, is usually represented by a 4 × 4 matrix, where each cell represents a byte. We denote the input of the i th round by S i , where i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and r is the number of rounds. S 0 is the plaintext and S r is the input to the final round. As shown in Figure 1 , S i j denotes the (j +1) th byte of the i th state, where j ∈ {0, . . . 15}. AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 have 10, 12, and 14 rounds respectively. Each round function is composed of 4 transformations except the last round: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The last round is lacking MixColumns.
• SubBytes: It is made up of the application of 16 identical 8 × 8 Sboxes.
This is a non-linear byte substitution. We denote the function of Sub- Bytes by SB. That is, SB(S i ) = SubBytes(S i ). We denote Inverse SubBytes by SB −1 .
• ShiftRows: Each row of the state is cyclically shifted over different offsets. Row 0 is not shifted, row 1 is shifted by 1 byte, row 2 is shifted by 2 bytes, and row 3 by 3 bytes. We denote ShiftRows and its inverse, InverseShiftRows, by SR and SR −1 respectively.
• MixColumns: This is a linear transformation to each column of the state. Each column is considered as polynomial over F 2 8 and multiplied modulo x 4 +1 with a fixed polynomial a(x) = 03 * x 3 +01 * x 2 +01 * x+02. We denote the function of MixColumns by MC and its inverse by MC −1 .
• AddRoundKey: It is a bitwise XOR with a round key.
Fault model
We first assume that a byte of an AES state is corrupted by fault injection and the corrupted value is random and unknown to the attacker. The information on which is corrupted among 16 bytes may be known. For example, in [17] Fukunaga and Takahashi showed that they could control the location of a corrupted byte. Although the attacker does not know which byte is corrupted, she can conduct 16 independent and equivalent analysis. Therefore we assume that the attacker knows the location of the corrupted byte. Later we loosen this and assume that several bytes are corrupted. Like in [35] , we assume that a random non-zero fault occurs across diagonals.
Differential fault equations in a one-byte fault model
As shown in figure 2 a byte fault induced between MixColumns of round r − 4 and r − 3 spreads to a column at the input of round r − 2 and to four columns at the input of round r − 1, where each column is affected by a onebyte error, and to four columns at the input of round r, where each column is affected by four faulty bytes. Depending on the methods of constructing and solving DFE's we have different results [33, 17, 41] . Hence, we propose a systematic method to construct DFE's as follows.
• Select a column of each round input that contains bytes affected by faulty values.
• The number of corrupted bytes in a column should be larger than the number of faulty bytes that affect them.
• Depending on the characteristics of the faulty values affecting bytes in a column, we construct a different type of DFE.
We can reduce the candidates of the key only when the number of corrupted bytes of a column is larger than the number of faulty bytes affecting those bytes (we will see in detail in Section 6). Therefore DFE's constructed from the columns at S r are useless. To explain types of DFE's, we focus on input and output differences of a nonlinear part, i.e., SubBytes. We use the following notations:
a correct byte input of the Sbox, X * i a faulty byte input of the Sbox,
the number of possible values for ∆X i when AES Sbox has 127 possible input differences for one output difference [2] . That is, #( 
Type A1
We can construct a type A differential fault equation when we know the exact value of the input difference of Sbox. We note that we always know the output difference as we know both correct and faulty ciphertexts. If we know input differences of m bytes, we denote by a type Am differential fault equation, where 1 ≤ m ≤ 4. Normally we know one byte input difference, we explain type A1 differential fault equation. We assume that we know input and output differences of one Sbox of round r. That is, we know (α, β) such that ∆X 1 = α and ∆Y 1 
1 . Y 1 can be represented as a linear combination of keys. That is,
where f is a linear function. For example, in the final round of AES,
, where C 1 is one byte of the ciphertext C and K r 1 is the corresponding byte of the last round subkey. Similarly Y *
, where C * 1 is one byte of the faulty ciphertext C * . As C 1 and C * 1 are known, we can find the difference
We also know ∆X 1 = α. Hence, we have two candidates for Y 1 . Therefore we have two possible values for K
We can make a differential fault equation: 
Type B3 and B4
T ype B3 and T ype B4 equations are the extension of T ype B2 equation for three and four bytes respectively. We can make a T ype B3 differential 2 This is the case that we pick up 127 balls twice independently and find the match among 255 different balls. The average expected number is fault equation as follows:
8 . So we have P T ype B3 = Note. Until now we have considered differential fault equations at S r . Hence, 
, where a j is a constant.
Differential fault analysis in a one-byte fault model
As we have P T ype B4 < P T ype B3 < P T ype B2 < P T ype A1 , it is better to construct as many B4 equations as possible. In a one-byte fault model we can construct at most five B4 equations. However, sometimes we need to transform B4 equations into A1, B1, B2, or B3 equations to reduce the time complexity. We show how to construct and solve DFE's in AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. Furthermore we show how to estimate the number of wrong candidates that can be removed with DFE's, which leads us to find the minimal number of faults in a given fault model.
DFA on AES-128
If a fault is induced between MixColumns of round r − 3 and r − 2, we can make four B4 differential fault equations at S r and one B4 differential fault equation at S r−1 . Without loss of generality, we assume that the first byte of the state is corrupted by the fault. Then we have wrong candidates. Therefore two faults are enough to find AES-192 secret key. However we have to be careful in exploiting these equations. We show two attacks that exploit the equations differently and therefore give different results.
Attack 1
We assume that we have two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts by inducing a fault between MixColumns of round r − 3 and r − 2. Then, we can make eight B4 differential fault equations at S r and two B4 differential fault equations at S r−1 . That is, we have: , that include K r−1 . As we know the left half of K r−1 , we transform these two B4 equations into the following equations 3 that include only the right half of K r−1 : 4 , A1). 3 We note that with K r and the left half of K r−1 we can find the input difference of one faulty byte of S r−1 [21] . Therefore we can construct A1 equations that have only the right half of K r−1 . Compute the left half of K r−1 from K r by AES key schedule.
5
Find the input difference of one faulty byte of S r−1 .
6
Construct DFE we can reduce the number of candidates for (K
Attack 2
In the previous attack eight B4 equations are used to find K r . into the following equations that have only the left half of K r−1 : Construct five A1 equations for the 3 rd column of K r−1 and find it.
12
Construct five A1 equations for the 4 th column of K r−1 and find it.
13
Find the AES-192 secret key by AES key schedule with K r and the right half of K r−1 .
14 Output AES-192 secret key.
15 end
DFA on AES-256
To find the secret key of AES-256 we need K r and K r−1 . With one pair of correct and faulty ciphertexts we can make five B4 equations and remove 2 120 wrong candidates. With two pairs we can make ten B4 equations and remove 2 240 wrong candidates. Theoretically with two pairs we can reduce the key space for AES-256 from 2 256 to 2 16 . We describe two methods to find the AES-256 key.
Attack with two faults
Our attack is similar to that of Li et al. in [26] to find the AES-256 key with two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts. However, our attack uses different DFE's systematically made according to Section 4 and the fact that MixColumns and AddRoundKey can be switched, i.e., MC(A) ⊕ K = MC(A ⊕ MC −1 (K)). We assume that one pair of correct and faulty ciphertexts is obtained by inducing a fault between MixColumns of round r − 3 and r − 2 and the other is obtained by inducing a fault one round earlier. Then we have the following equations: (See Algorithm 3).
Attack with three faults
The overall complexity of the previous attack with two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts is 2 48 , which is too high to be implemented. Therefore we try to find a practical solution with one more pair of correct and faulty ciphertexts. With three pairs we can construct fifteen B4 equations and remove (2 120 ) 3 = 2 360 wrong candidates. Therefore three faults are enough to find 256 bits of the secret key of AES-256. We assume that we can obtain two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts by inducing a fault between MixColumns of round r − 3 and r − 2 and a pair by inducing a fault one round earlier. With the first and the second pairs we construct eight B4 equations at S r and therefore find K r . With the third pair we construct four B4 equations at S r−1 and therefore reduce the number of candidates for K r−1 from 2 128 to 2 32 . Finally we find K r−1 with two B4 equations at S r−1 from the first and the second pairs.
Differential fault equations in a multi-byte fault model
Up to now we assume that one byte is disturbed by fault injection. We loosen this and assume that several bytes are corrupted together. Following the models in [35] , we assume four models where a non-zero fault is injected at the input of the i th round:
• Model 0 (M 0): A random non-zero fault is induced in one of the diag- Find the AES-256 secret key by the AES key schedule.
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Return 2 16 candidates for the AES-256 secret key. where a diagonal is a set of four bytes of the state. We have the following four diagonals:
Differential fault equations in M 1
The differential fault equations in M 0 are the same as those in Section 4. Hence, we start with M 1. We do not know the input differences of Sboxes but the relation among them. We denote new differential fault equations for two, three, and four bytes in M 1 by T ype C2, C3, and C4 equations respectively to distinguish them from B2, B3, and B4 equations. At most two bytes are corrupted in each column of the input of the i th MixColumns. We denote errors in two bytes by α 1 and α 2 . Then we have R(
since both ∆X 1 and ∆X 2 can take any value. For each pair of (∆X 1 , ∆X 2 ), the number of possible candidates for (Y 1 , Y 2 ) is 4. As we have 2 14 possible pairs of (∆X 1 , ∆X 2 ), the number of possible candidates for (Y 1 , Y 2 ) (and therefore for (K In a C3 equation, we have R( a 3,1 α 1 + a 3,2 α 2 ) , where a i,j is a constant. We can rewrite R(∆X 1 , ∆X 2 , ∆X 3 ) as:
where a, b, and c are constants. Then #(( 
, where a i,j is a constant. We can rewrite R(∆X 1 , ∆X 2 , ∆X 3 , ∆X 4 ) as: 
where a i,j , a, b, c and d are constants. The number of possible values for (∆X 1 , ∆X 2 , ∆X 3 , ∆X 4 ) satisfying 32 . Then using at least two B4 equations, we can find the key. We note that our attack needs one less pair compared to that of [35] where four pairs were required. 
Comparison and Conclusions
We summarize differential fault analysis on AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in Table 1 , 2, and 3.
For one-byte fault model, our attacks on AES-192 and AES-256 show the best performance. In our previous work [21] , attacks on AES-192 output 2 32 or 2 8 candidates with two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts. Therefore we have to perform exhaustive search. However the new attack outputs one correct value for the AES-192 key with two pairs. Considering AES-256, our previous attack in [21] outputs 2 32 candidates but the new attack finds one correct key with the same three pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts. Our attack on AES-128 in a multi-byte model needs less faulty ciphertexts. In M 2, we need three pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts. However the previous work in [35] needs four pairs.
There are four directions in the research of differential fault analysis. Many works have been proposed to improve DFA into one or two directions. In this article we consider the main three directions together and show how to improve differential fault analysis in all three directions. Although the same fault model is used, the required numbers of faults are different in the previous works. This comes from lack of detail examination on constructing and solving differential fault equations. Hence, we propose a general method of constructing differential fault equations systematically. Based on this we can estimate how many wrong candidates of the subkey can be removed before solving the equations, which leads us to find the minimum number of faults in a given fault model. Following the systematic method of constructing differential fault equations, we propose new differential fault analysis on AES-192 and AES-256 in a one-byte fault model. We further increase our attacks to multi-byte fault models and propose a better attack on AES-128. Finally we propose the first results on differential fault analysis of AES-192 and AES-256 in multi-byte fault models. 
